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CRIMINAL LAW-THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT: DE
FENDANT'S FRIEND OR FOE? COMMONWEALTH v. BASTARACHE, 1980

Mass. Adv. Sh. 2465, 414 N.E.2d 984.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The development of standards used to determine whether a jury
is constitutionally composed is of both historic and current interest. 1
The recent Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Bastarache 2 il
lustrates judicial attempts to formulate standards that accommodate
different constitutional interests.
On May 26, 1978, twenty-year-old Mark E. Bastarache was in
volved in a bar brawl as a result of which Pete Wilbur, the individual
with whom Bastarache was fighting, died. 3 A grand jury, sitting in
Franklin County, Massachusetts, indicted Bastarache for man
slaughter.- Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the indict
ment and the jury pool on the grounds that persons between the ages
of eighteen and thirty-four had been underrepresented in the Frank
lin County jury venire since 1970.4 The motion was denied at a pre
trial hearing and Bastarache was later tried before a jury and found
guilty of manslaughter. s
The appeals court, in reversing the superior court, relied prima
rily on defendant's constitutional challenge to the composition of the
jury poo1.6 The supreme judicial court upheld the reversal but on
different grounds. 7 The supreme judicial court disagreed with the
1. The text and footnotes that follow demonstrate that the constitutionality ofjury
composition has been of interest to courts, legislatures, and commentators for decades.
2. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2465,414 N.E.2d 984.
3. Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1729, 1731-32,409
N.E.2d 796,799.
4. Id. at 1733, 409 N.E.2d at 799-800.
5. Id. at 1729,409 N.E.2d at 798.
6. The conviction was appealed on four grounds, including the challenge to the
composition of the jury pool. The other three grounds were based on objections to the
evidentiary rulings and instructions of the superior court judge relating to: (1) The ad
mission of autopsy photographs; (2) the instructions on self-defense; and, (3) the Com
monwealth's theory of wanton and reckless conduct. Id. at 1732, 409 N.E.2d at 799.
7. The supreme judicial court agreed with the appeals court that
[T]he autopsy photographs of the victim's brain and of the interior of his skull
after the brain was removed were inflammatory, graphic, and grisley; . : . the
defendant's claim of self-defense would not have been foreclosed by a finding
that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was drunk: and
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appeals court's conclusion "that the age group (eighteen-to-thirty
four) was underrepresented in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States."8 In rejecting the sixth
amendment challenge, the supreme judicial court found that "classi
fications based on age alone do not involve identifiable or distinctive
groups for Federal constitutional purposes and that the jury lists in
Franklin County were not deficient under the Constitution of the
United States."9
II.

THE DECISION

Bastarache's arguments before the Massach~setts Supreme Ju
dicial Court encompassed both sixth and fourteenth amendment fed
eral constitutional concerns. \0 Grand jury indictments are not
constitutionally required of the states as a necessary prerequisite to
state criminal trials; thus, the challenge to the grand jury indictment
is subject only to equal protection analysis under the fourteenth
amendment. 11 A challenge to the composition of the petit jury, how
ever, falls within the purview of the sixth amendment. 12
In defining the constitutional test to be applied under the four
teenth amendment, the court relied solely on Castaneda v. Partida: 13
The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recogniz
able, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the
laws, as written or as applied. Next, there must be a demonstra
tion of disproportionate underrepresentation over a significant pe
riod of time. Finally, if the selection procedure is susceptible of
abuse or is not racially neutral, the statistical showing supports the
presumption of discrimination. 14

The sixth amendment test relied upon by the supreme judicial court
susceptible to injury; [and] ... no charge should have been given based on the
.
theory of wanton and reckless conduct. . . .
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482-84, 414 N.E.2d at 996-97.
8. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2466, 414 N.E.2d at 987.
9. Id. at 2478, 414 N.E.2d at 993.
10. Id. at 2467, 414 N.E.2d at 987,988.
11. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884).
12. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The sixth amendment right to an impartial jury applies to state criminal
trials through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Loui
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968).
13. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
14. Id. at 494.
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in Bastarache was found in Duren v. Missouri: 15
[To establish a] prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged
to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that
the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresenta
tion is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selec
tion process. 16

The supreme judicial court then concluded that, although the show
ing of a disparate impact on a group is necessary under both amend
ments, differences exist between the tests in both the first and third
steps.
The first step contemplates the establishment of a distinctive
group for sixth amendment purposes and the establishment of an
identifiable group for fourteenth amendment purposes. The court
noted that "[tJhe focus of the equal protection clause has been on
classes that have historically been saddled with disabilities or sub
jected to unequal treatment,"17 while the sixth amendment's concern
is "the broader principle that juries should be drawn from a source
fairly representative of the community."18 The court then deter
mined that, for the purposes of the first step, it may be easier to find
a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes than an identifi
able group for fourteenth amendment equal protection purposes. 19
The second step in both tests requires evidence that the group,
established in step one, was disproportionately represented in the
jury venire. The third step requires a showing that the dispropor
tionate underrepresentation is the result of systematic exclusion. 20
The different treatment given this third step is characterized by the
supreme judicial court in the following manner: "Equal protection,
for the purposes of the case before us (i.e., one not based on race),
requires a showing that the selection procedure is susceptible of
abuse, while the Sixth Amendment requires a showing that the un
derrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
15. 439 U.s. 357 (1979).
16. Id. at 364. For a discussion of proof of systematic exclusion, see Comment,
"Jury-mandering'~· Federal Jury Selection and the Generation Gal', 59 IOWA L. REV. 401,
404-07 (1973).
17. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Comment, supra note 16, at 403-05.
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selection process."21
Once the prima facie case has been established, the burden of
proof then shifts to the state; that burden is defined differently for
each amendment:
Equal protection principles allow the State to show an absence of
intent to discriminate, while the Sixth Amendment test appears to
involve less a question of intent than a showing that there were
significant interests served by the selection process that resulted in
the exclusion or underrepresentation of a distinctive group.22

The above distinctions, drawn in Bastarache, are academic for
purposes of the case before the court. The supreme judicial court's
holding that "youth" constitutes neither a distinctive, nor an identifi
able, group precludes further inquiry into the constitutional chal
lenge. Through dicta the court hypothesized the arguments the state
could make that would be sufficient to rebut a prima facie case estab
lished under each amendment. 23
The supreme judicial court's holding that youth does not consti
tute a cognizable group places Bastarache 24 clearly within the main
stream of both state and federal decisions. 25 The court's treatment of
youth is disturbing in light of the statement that "a group might con
stitute a 'distinctive' group in the community for Sixth Amendment
purposes but not an 'identifiable' group for equal protection
purposes."26
If the Bastarache distinction is accurate, the question becomes:
What factors must be considered to find a group distinctive for sixth
amendment purposes, but not identifiable for fourteenth amendment
purposes? The Bastarache court correctly noted that broader protec
tion should be afforded the individual under the sixth amendment
than under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
This note examines the hypothesis that the Bastarache distinction of
group identity between these amendments is essentially meaningless
21. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992.
22. Id. at 2475-76,414 N.E.2d at 992.
23. See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478-79, 414 N.E.2d at 993.
24. For articles addressing the issue of whether youth should constitute a cogniza
ble group under present judicial analysis, see Zeigler, Young Adults As A Cognizable
Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (1978); Comment, supra note 16; Com
ment, The Exclusion Of Young Adults From Juries: A Threat to Jury Impartiality, 66 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 150 (1975).
25. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2476 n.lO, 414 N.E.2d at 992-93 n.lO. See generally
Zeigler, supra note 24.
26. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992.
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and will suggest a more meaningful way to distinguish the different
interests of the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT

A. Historical Basis
The belief that the sixth and fourteenth amendments contem
plate protection of different interests and, therefore, demand differ
ent tests can be substantiated through an examination of their
geneses.
The sixth amendment, from its inception, extended greater pro
tection to the individual. The individual, previously afforded the
right to due process of law by the fifth amendment,27 was given the
right to an impartial jury trial. This is more than the "right" to a
trial, but the right to a "judgment of [one's] peers."28
The sixth amendment finds its roots in language found within
Article III of the United States Constitution. 29 The language of Arti
cle III was derived from the Magna Charta, in which it was declared,
"that no man shall be arrested, nor imprisoned, nor banished, nor
deprived of life, &c., but by the judgement of his peers, or by the law
of the land."30 It then can be inferred that the sixth amendment's
"impartial jury" was a transposition of the language of the Magna
Charta that required 'Judgement of [one's] peers."
The fourteenth amendment historically has been focused on dif
27.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be com.eelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. See notes 30, 34 & 40 infra.
29.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State, where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
30. J. STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1854) (quoting the Magna Charta). In Justice Story's study of the Constitu
tion, he stated that
[t)he judgement of his peers here alluded to, and commonly called, in the
quaint language offormer times, a trial per pais, or trial by the country, is the
trial by a jury, who are called the peers of the party accused, being of the like
condition and equality in the state. Id.
The sixth amendment was added, therefore, according to Justice Story "[i)n order to
secure this great paladium of liberty, the trial by jury, in criminal cases, from all possibil
ity of abuse. . . which add greatly to the original constitutional barriers against persecu
tion and oppression." Id. at 230.
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ferent concerns. Historical analysis indicates that the fourteenth
amendment had a dual purpose. It was intended to protect the rights
of groups from unjustifiable and invidious discriminations. The
fourteenth amendment also made due process protections found
within the fifth amendment applicable to the states. The fourteenth
amendment, in general, entitled individuals in criminal matters, "the
right of trial, according to the process and proceedings of the com
mon law."3!
The "concerns of equality and even-handedness in governmen
tal action" is the underlying thrust of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.32 The clause fundamentally addresses the
struggle between individuals seeking equality and the government's
right to legislate laws that classify.33
The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is directed
at collective protection whereas the sixth amendment's focus is on
the protection of individuals. 34 The courts, generally, have not
31. Id. at 233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I states in part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
32. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991 (1978).
33. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 343,
343-44 (1949).
34. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has also been relied on in
evaluating jury composition cases. See generally United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United
States v. Deardorff, 343 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Gargan, 314 F.
Supp. 414 (W.D. Wis. 1970), affd sub. nom. United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972).
The fourteenth amendment's due process clause is not necessarily different from the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. u[T)he due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments have [also) been held to yield norms of equal treatment
indistinguishable from those of the equal protection clause." L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at
992. The due process clause, however, is historically distinguishable from the "impartial
jury" language of the sixth amendment.
In a discussion of the fifth amendment's due process language, Justice Story indi
cated that it also derives from the Magna Charta. J. STORY, supra note 3D, at 233. The
roots of the due process clause may be found in the language U[n)either will we pass upon
him, or condemn him, but by the lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the
land." Id. In particular,
these latter words, 'by the law of the land' mean, by due process of law; that is,
without due presentment or indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto
by due process of the common law. So that this clause, in effect, affirms the
right of trial, according to the process and proceedings of the common law.
Id.
The "due process" clause also exists within the fourteenth amendment. Utilizing
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adopted this historical analysis. "Indeed, the reasoning that prohib
its the arbitrary exclusion of cognizable classes from jury service has
been fundamentally the same whatever the constitutional context."35
It is the contention of this note that the sixth amendment's impartial
jury requirement has been consumed by the filtering effect of the
fourteenth amendment thereby reducing it to the interests of equal
protection and due process. The result will be future cases similar to
Bastarache, in which the court fails to constitutionally condemn
practices that preclude an individual's right to a judgment by a jury
of his peers.

B. Judicial Development
Courts have looked primarily to the jury's composition to deter
mine whether the defendant has been given his right to an impartial
jury trial. This right presently is characterized as the right to jury
representation by a fair cross-section of the community.36 The tests
that have developed to determine whether this right has been pro
tected are derived from several sources.
In addition to the sixth and fou~eenth amendments, challenges
to jury composition have been brought under the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution,37 under the United States Supreme
Court's supervisory power over federal courts,38 and, since 1968,
under the federal Jury Selection and Service Act. 39
The right of a criminal defendant to an impartial jury was noted
in the context of a sixth amendment decision made in 1888 by the
United States Supreme Court. 40 In 1968, the United States Supreme
normal rules of statutory construction, it is obvious that ''judgement of his peers" and
"law of the land" have separate meanings. Likewise, the right to an "impartial jury" and
the right to "due process of law" contemplate different interests.
35. State v. Jenison, 405 A.2d 3, 7 (R.I. 1979). A challenge was brought in Jenison
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to a statute that resulted in the total exclu
sion of members of the academic community from the jury pool. The court held that the
academic community constituted a cognizable group, and that its exclusion, without a
rational justification, was a violation of the fair cross-section requirement.
36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975).
37. See cases cited note 34 supra.
38. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pa
cific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
39. 28 U.S.c. §§ 1861-69 (1968), as amended by Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 54. See also Comment, supra note 16.
40. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
Except in that class or grade of offences [sic] called petty offences [sic], which,
according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any
tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury
to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or
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Court applied the right to an impartial jury trial in criminal cases to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 41 This right was de
fined further by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana,42 where
the Court held that "the selection of a petit jury from a representa
tive cross section of the community is an essential component of the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."43
Taylor's cross-section requirement finds its roots in a case tried
more than one hundred years ago. In Strauder v. West Virginia,44 a
black defendant challenged a state law that prohibited blacks from
participating on juries. The United States Supreme Court concluded
that the prohibition infringed upon defendant's right to a fair trial45
and upon members of the excluded class. 46 The Court held this to be
a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 47
This equal protection concern with a defendant's right to fair
trial became more focused in a 1940 Supreme Court decision. In
Smith v. Texas,48 a black defendant challenged a practice that re
sulted in the exclusion of blacks from jury service.49 The Court held
the practice to be a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. 50 In language frequently cited, the Court stated:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru

ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community. For ... discrimination to result in the exclu
sion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only vio
lates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war
under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that
mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for
the offence [sic) charged.
Id. at 557.
41. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, petitioner challenged
the validity of a Louisiana constitutional provision that denied his request for a jury trial.
Petitioner was tried and convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor. Louisiana permit
ted jury trials only in cases where capital punishment, or a hard labor sentence could be
imposed.
42. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
43. Id. at 528.
44. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
45. Id. at 308-09.
46. Id. at 308.
47. Id. at 310.
48. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
49. In Harris County, Texas, blacks constituted over 20% of the population, yet in
the years 1931 through 1938, there never had been more than two black persons on the
grand jury in any given year. Only five of the 384 grand jurors who served during that
period were black. Id. at 128-29.
50. Id. at 132.
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with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representa
tive government. 51

Smith more clearly defined, in equal protection terms, the inter
est to be guarded. The jury must be "a body truly representative of
the community."52 This concept was further refined through a tri1
ogy of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the ex
ercise of its supervisory powers over juries in fede~al courts.
The first case in the tri1ogy, Glasser v. United States,53 held that
the practice of adding women to jury rolls solely from lists furnished
by t~e Illinois League of Women Voters violated defendant's right to
an impartialjury.54 In determining the requirements for state provi
sion of this right,· the Court concluded that the jury must represent a
"cross-section of the community."55
The two cases that followed, Thiel v. Southern Pac!ftc Co. 56 and
Ballard v. United States ,57 echoed Glasser's mandate in requiring
that jury lists be representative of a cross-section of the community.
In Thiel, a jury venire was stricken due to its exclusion of all who
worked for a daily wage;58 in Ballard, the Court condemned the ex
clusion of women from grand and petit juries.59
By 1946, the requirement that a jury be drawn from a fair cross
section of the population had become entrenched. Although contro
versy surrounds the source of the fair cross-section requirement,60
the better analysis attributes it to the province of the fourteenth
amendment.61 Strauder and Smith clearly were decided under this
amendment. 62 Glasser, Thiel, and Ballard were decided by exercise
of the Supreme Court's supervisory power. 63 These decisions, taken
Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
Id.
53. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
54. 315 U.S. at 86.
55. Id.
56. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
57. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
58. 328 U.S. at 221-22.
59. 329 U.S. at 193-94.
60. See notes 73-77 infra and accompanying text.
61. At least one court observed that the reasoning in jury composition cases is es
sentially the same regardless of the context in which the constitutional challenge is
brought. State v. Jenison, 405 A.2d 3, 7 (R.I. 1979); see text accompanying note 35 supra.
The cases primarily have been decided under either the fourteenth amendment or the
Supreme Court's supervisory power. See note 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
Since the sixth amendment was not made applicable to the states until 1968, the law in
this area is, as yet, inconclusive. See notes 41 supra & 64 infra.
62. See notes 44-52 supra.
63. See note 38 supra.
51.
52.
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in aggregate, concluded that whether an individual's right to an im
partial jury was violated depended upon the permissibility of under
representation of a particular group on the jury venire. The
resolution of the legality of excluding a particular group was there
fore a condition precedent to determining the validity of an individ
ual's claim that his right to an impartial jury had been violated.
Fourteenth amendment influence is evidenced by this approach and
the fair cross-section requirement is an obvious offspring of the four
teenth amendment. 64
C.

Taylor

The Supreme Court, in Taylor, adopted the fair cross-section
requirement as fundamental to the sixth amendment's mandate of an
impartial jury trial in criminal cases. 65 In Taylor, a male, convicted
of aggravated kidnapping, challenged the constitutionality of a Loui
siana law which provided that women were to be excluded from jury
service unless they filed a written statement expressly declaring the
intent to serve. 66 The specific issue before the Court was "whether
the presence of a fair-cross-section of the community on venires,
panels, or lists from which petit juries [were] drawn [was] essential to
the fulfillment of the sixth amendment's guarantee of an impartial
jury trial in criminal prosecutions."67 The Court concluded that "the
fair-cross-section requirement [was] fundamental to the jury trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."68 The Court specifically
found that this right had been violated where the result of the Loui
siana provision was the exclusion from jury venires of fifty-three per
cent of the citizens eligible for jury service. 69
Taylor is disturbing in the manner by which the Court arrived
at the adoption of the fair cross-section requirement. The Court cor
rectly relied on Duncan v. Louisiana, 70 in which it held that the sixth
64. It is the position of the dissent in both Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 539
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 370-71 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), that the fair cross-section requirement is a fourteenth amendment doctrine.
See text accompanying notes 74-82 infra.
65. 419 U.S. at 530.
66. The Louisiana statute provided that "[a) woman shall not be selected for jury
service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she
resides a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service." LA. CODE CRIM.
PRO. ANN. art. 402 (West 1966) (repealed 1975).
67. 419 U.S. at 526.
68. Id. at 530.
69. Id. at 531.
70. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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amendment right to an impartial jury was among those "fundamen
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions"7! and is therefore applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. 72 In Taylor, however, the
Court mistakenly held that the fair cross-section requirement had
developed as an essential component of the sixth amendment.1 3
The dissent emphatically noted that the cases relied upon by the
majority are more accurately characterized as fourteenth amend
ment due process and equal protection cases. 74 The Taylor dissent
continued by citing the interest to be protected under Duncan: "[The
jury trial for a serious offense is] essential for preventing miscar
riages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all
defendants."75
The Taylor debate was continued in 1979 when the Court, in
Duren v. Missouri,76 reversed a Missouri Supreme Court ruling that
Taylor's mandate that a jury venire be chosen from a fair cross-sec
tion of the community was not violated by a Missouri law. 77 The
statute required that women, who so requested, be granted an auto
matic exemption from jury duty.78 Following Missouri's failure to
rebut Duren's prima facie case, the Court declared the law
71. Id. at 148 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932».
72. Duncan was one in a line of cases providing to the states sixth amendment
protections through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. E.g., Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (Texas statutes prohibiting testimony by coparticipant
charged in the same crime held unconstitutional as violative of defendant's right to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for his defense); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (right to speedy trial declared fundamental and therefore
applicable to states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (right of criminal defend
ant in state court to cross-examine witness held to be fundamental right); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant in state court held
to have fundamental right to counsel).
73. ''The unmistakable import of this Court's opinions, at least since 1940, . . . and
not repudiated by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from a repre
sentative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amend
ment right to a jury trial." 419 U.S. at 528 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 539.
75. Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
158 (1968».
76. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
77. Id. at 370.
78. UNo citizen shall be disqualified from jury service because of sex, but the court
shall excuse any woman who requests exemption therefrom before being sworn as a ju
ror." Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 226. This constitutional mandate is implemented by Mo.
REV. STAT. § 494.031(2) (Supp. 1978) which states that U[t)he following persons, shall,
upon their timely application to the court, be excused from service as a juror, either
grand or petit; . . . (2) Any woman who requests exemption before being sworn as a
juror. . . ." Id.
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unconstitutional. 79
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority was not
primarily interested in whether Duren had been given a fair trial as
mandated by Duncan, 80 but instead with whether women had "par
ticipate[d] in the judicial process. . . ."81 He argued that this was
neither a sixth amendment impartial jury concern nor a concern of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, but rather was
a fourteenth amendment equal protection issue. 82
Although Justice Rehnquist advocated the purging of the fair
cross-section requirement from sixth amendment analysis, it is, in
stead, the Court's unqualified adoption of the fourteenth amendment
fair cross-section requirement in Taylor that leads to the difficulties
manifested in decisions such as Bastarache. 83
IV.

BASTARACHE

In Bastarache, the supreme judicial court held that defendant's
right to an impartial jury was not violated. This decision was made
with the knowledge that only eighteen-and-one-half percent of the
jury venire was composed of eighteen to thirty-four-year-olds eligi
ble for jury duty in an area where thirty-six percent of the eligible
individuals were in that age group.84 Bastarache was decided
against defendant despite his being a member of the excluded age
group.
At the most fundamental level, these facts indicate that Bas
tarache was deprived of his traditional right to a judgment by his
peers. It is precisely the fair cross-section requirement, as adopted
by Taylor, that imposes a fourteenth amendment concern upon the
sixth amendment. The fair cross-section requirement does not ad
dress the sixth amendment's concern for the right to an impartial
jury.
The court in Bastarache did acknowledge that determination of
79. 439 u.s. at 369-70.
80. 391 U.S. at 157-58.
81. 439 U.S. at 371 note (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 371.
83. Taylor correctly recognized that the jury is a ''prophylactic vehicle" whose pur
pose is to "guard against the exercise of arbitrary power." 419 U.S. at 530. On this basis,
Taylor mandates that the state meet an increased burden once the initial establishment
of a constitutional violation has been made. The fourteenth amendment compels the
state to meet a rational relationship test to justify its laws in cases dealing with non
suspect classifications, whereas the sixth amendment commands that "[t)he right to a
proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds." Id. at 534.
84. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2467, 414 N.E.2d at 988.
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the existence of a group may be easier under the sixth amendment
than under the fourteenth amendment. 85 The Bastarache court did
this by echoing the Supreme Court's characterizations of the types of
groups protected under both amendments. 86 The difference between
a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes and an identifiable
group for fourteenth amendment purposes is of dubious value. Al
though Bastarache attempted to expand the protections provided
under the sixth amendment, differentiation between distinctive and
identifiable is not the proper means to that end. Adjectives describ
ing groups to be protected historically have been used liberally and
interchangeably.
In Smith, an equal protection case, the Court used the adjective
"qualified" to describe the type of group protected under the four
teenth amendment: "For racial discrimination to result in the exclu
sion from jury service of otherwise qual!fted groups not only violates
our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with
our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government."87
Hernandez v. Texas 88 involved an equal protection challenge
made to the exclusion from the jury pool of individuals of Mexican
origin. The characterization of the group protected under the four
teenth amendment is what the Duren and Bastarache courts charac
terized as a sixth amendment standard: "When the existence of a
distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws,
as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment
not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the
Constitution have been violated."89
As recently as Taylor, a clear sixth amendment case, the Court
held: "Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
ident!ftable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial."90 The criteria
used to determine whether a group is distinctive or identifiable is as
enigmatic as the impact of the distinctions noted in Bastarache. This
difficulty apparently is inherent in the process of distinguishing
groups from nongroups, and only further exemplifies the need to
85. Id. at 2475, 414 N.E.2d at 992.
Id. at 2475-76, 414 N.E.2d at 992.
87. 311 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added).
88. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
89. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
90. 419 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added).
86.
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amend the fair cross-section requirement when applied to situations
as that in Bastarache.
The frustration experienced in attempting to determine whether
a distinct group objectively exists was voiced in the Duren dissent:
This Court resorted to similar mystical incantations. . .[n]oting
that the effect of excluding any large and identifiable segment of
the community from jury service "is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable." ... [I]n
Taylor v. Louisiana. . .the Court based its reversal of a. . . con
viction largely on the transcendental notion that "a flavor, a dis
tinct quality" was absent from his jury panel . . . .91

In sixth amendment challenges to the composition of a particu
lar jury pool, the solution to the problems raised by Bastarache lies
in amending the fair cross-section requirement.

v.

CRITICISM

Fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection con
cerns permit an individual to bring a suit against the systematic ex
clusion of a cognizable group even if he is not a member of that
group. This is so because there is more at stake under the fourteenth
amendment than protection of the individual. "When a grand or
petit jury has been selected on an impermissible basis, the existence
of a constitutional violation does not depend on the circumstances of
the person making the claim. . . .The exclusion of ... any ...
well-defined class of citizens, offends a number of related constitu
tional values."92
The fourteenth amendment analysis broadened the rights of an
individual in order to afford greater judicial scrutiny of potential dis
crimination against various groups. A requirement that the individ
ual be a member of the group whose exclusion is being contested
would obstruct protection of these fourteenth amendment interests.
This principle has been extended to sixth amendment analysis. 93
The extension, however, has been mechanical and little considera
tion has been given to the protections that the sixth amendment was
designed to provide. The sixth amendment should afford the indi
91. 439 U.S. at 372 note (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972).
93. ''Thus if the Sixth Amendment were applicable here ... he would clearly have
standing to challenge the systematic exclusion of any identifiable group from jury serv
ice." Id. at 500.
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vidual greater protections than does the fourteenth amendment. 94
The prime concern of the sixth amendment's impartial jury require
ment is that the individual be given a fair trial. This is a question of
fundamental fairness and fundamental rightS. 95 When a violation of
this sixth amendment right has been alleged, the facts and circum
stances of each case must be examined and the test to determine a
constitutional violation should be applied on a case-by-case basis.
In both Taylor and J)uren, where appellant was not a member
of the excluded group, the fair cross-section requirement provided
protection against arbitrary jury selection procedures. 96 In a situa
tion such as Bastarache, however, where appellant is a member of
the excluded group, the fair cross-section requirement acts as a re
straint on the individual's right to an impartial jury trial. This is
particularly so when the group to which the appellant belongs, is not
recognized as a group for traditional fourteenth amendment
purposes. 97
In a situation where the plaintiff is a member of the excluded
group, the requirement that the group be "a 'distinctive' group in the
community"98 should be eliminated from the three elements neces
sary to establish a fair cross-section violation under Taylor and
under the sixth amendment. The fair cross-section requirement, in
such a situation, should demand a showing of a disproportionate
representation on the jury venire over a period of time. The burden
should then shift to the state to justify this underrepresentation by
more than "merely rational grounds. "99
VI.

CONCLUSION

The right of a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury selected
from a fair cross-section of the community is a hybrid. It has
evolved from judicial attempts to define the extent of the guarantees
of the United States Constitution that provide that a criminal de
fendant be tried by due process of law and by an impartial jury.
In the dawn of this evolution, courts primarily were answering
challenges brought under the fourteenth amendment. The roots of
the fair cross-section requirement thus were drawn from the con
cerns addressed by the fourteenth amendment's due process and
94. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530; see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 368.
95. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 157-58.
96. See notes 41 & 83 supra.
97. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
98. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2474, 414 N.E.2d at 992.
99. See note 83 supra.

332

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:317

equal protection clauses. The Court in Strauder, Smith, Glasser, and
Ballard considered the constitutional safeguards afforded blacks and
women to ensure their equal participation in the jury system. The
guarantees of a fair trial and due process of law primarily were de
fined through the protections given to constitutionally recognized
groups.
In 1968 the Supreme Court, in JJuncan, extended the sixth
amendment guarantee that a criminal defendant be given an impar
tial jury trial to include trials in state courts. In 1975, against the
historical backdrop of fourteenth amendment analysis, Taylor de
fined the right to an impartial jury as being a right to be tried by a
fair cross-section of the community.
The sixth amendment mandate for an impartial jury, however,
contemplates more than a right to a trial by jurors chosen from a fair
cross-section of the community. The right to an impartial jury his
torically was intended to guarantee a trial by a jury of one's peers.
The focus of the fair cross-section requirement is upon the right of
constitutionally recognized groups to equal representation on jury
vemres.
The potential inequitable application of the fair cross-section
requirement to sixth amendment impartial jury cases is demon
strated by Bastarache. In that case, a twenty-year-old defendant
challenged the composition of the jury venire in Franklin County,
Massachusetts, as underrepresenting individuals between the ages of
eighteen and thirty-four.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged this
circumstance and indicated that it had existed for a period of time.
The dictates of the fair cross-section requirement, however, mandate
a determination that the excluded group be constitutionally recog
nizable before a violation of the requirement is found. The supreme
judicial court indicated that although it may be easier to find a cog
nizable group under sixth amendment analysis than under the four
teenth amendment, the court decided to follow the mainstream of
both state and federal decisions. The court held that age classifica
tion did not constitute a cognizable group and therefore defendant
was not deprived of his right to a trial by an impartial jury.
When an individual challenges practices or laws that result in
the exclusion from the jury venire of a group to which he belongs,
the sixth amendment's protections demand an easing of the four
teenth amendment requirements. The sixth amendment requires
that the individual be given a fair trial by an impartial jury, a judg
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ment by one's peers. The focus is on the treatment of the individual.
The fair cross-section requirements should not become a barrier to
sixth amendment claims, nor should the individual's relation to the
protected group be a barrier to fourteenth amendment claims.
James D. Horwitz

